The Counter-deception Blog

Interesting developments…violating long-standing PSYOPS and Public Affairs “truth principle” traditions, and the well-established concept that obvious lies and mis–representions are counter-productive to long-term PSYOP and PA goals.

False US PSYOP campaigns during the Vietnam War were somewhat successful against North Vietnam, making the NVN believe there were US-SVN espionage and subversion groups active in NVN. The net effect of these PSYOP efforts however, were greatly enhanced NVN counter-espionage and counter-intelligence operations, to the extent that all US and SVN agents in the North came under NVN control, capture, or elimination. The US PSYOP helped motivate NVN to conduct an outstanding double-cross operation against us. [See Richard H. Shultz, Jr., The Secret War Against Hanoi : The Untold Story of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam.]

NB: "According to several Pentagon officials, the strategic communications programs at the Defense Department are being coordinated by the office ofthe undersecretary of Defense for policy, Douglas J. Feith" ...described by General Tommy Franks, retired CENTCOM Commander, as "getting a reputation around here as the dumbest guy on the planet."

LA Times 1 Dec 2004
THE NATION
PR Meets Psy-Ops in War on Terror
The use of misleading information as a military tool sparks debate in the Pentagon. Critics say the practice puts credibility at stake.
By Mark Mazzetti
Times Staff Writer

December 1, 2004

WASHINGTON - On the evening of Oct. 14, a young Marine spokesman near
Fallouja appeared on CNN and made a dramatic announcement.

"Troops crossed the line of departure," 1st Lt. Lyle Gilbert declared, using
a common military expression signaling the start of a major campaign. "It's
going to be a long night." CNN, which had been alerted to expect a major
news development, reported that the long-awaited offensive to retake the
Iraqi city of Fallouja had begun.

In fact, the Fallouja offensive would not kick off for another three weeks.
Gilbert's carefully worded announcement was an elaborate psychological
operation - or "psy-op" - intended to dupe insurgents in Fallouja and allow
U.S. commanders to see how guerrillas would react if they believed U.S.
troops were entering the city, according to several Pentagon officials.

In the hours after the initial report, CNN's Pentagon reporters were able to
determine that the Fallouja operation had not, in fact, begun.

"As the story developed, we quickly made it clear to our viewers exactly
what was going on in and around Fallouja," CNN spokesman Matthew Furman
said.

Officials at the Pentagon and other U.S. national security agencies said the
CNN incident was not an isolated feint - the type used throughout history by
armies to deceive their enemies - but part of a broad effort underway within
the Bush administration to use information to its advantage in the war on
terrorism.

The Pentagon in 2002 was forced to shutter its controversial Office of
Strategic Influence (OSI), which was opened shortly after the Sept. 11
attacks, after reports that the office intended to plant false news stories
in the international media. But officials say that much of OSI's mission -
using information as a tool of war - has been assumed by other offices
throughout the U.S. government.

Although most of the work remains classified, officials say that some of the
ongoing efforts include having U.S. military spokesmen play a greater role
in psychological operations in Iraq, as well as planting information with
sources used by Arabic TV channels such as Al Jazeera to help influence the
portrayal of the United States.

Other specific examples were not known, although U.S. national security
officials said an emphasis had been placed on influencing how foreign media
depict the United States.

These efforts have set off a fight inside the Pentagon over the proper use
of information in wartime. Several top officials see a danger of blurring
what are supposed to be well-defined lines between the stated mission of
military public affairs - disseminating truthful, accurate information to
the media and the American public - and psychological and information
operations, the use of often-misleading information and propaganda to
influence the outcome of a campaign or battle.

Several of those officials who oppose the use of misleading information
spoke out against the practice on the condition of anonymity.

"The movement of information has gone from the public affairs world to the
psychological operations world," one senior defense official said. "What's
at stake is the credibility of people in uniform."

Pentagon spokesman Lawrence Di Rita said he recognized the concern of many
inside the Defense Department, but that "everybody understands that there's
a very important distinction between information operations and public
affairs. Nobody has offered serious proposals that would blur the
distinction between these two functions."

Di Rita said he had asked his staff for more information about how the Oct.
14 incident on CNN came about.

One recent development critics point to is the decision by commanders in
Iraq in mid-September to combine public affairs, psychological operations
and information operations into a "strategic communications" office. An
organizational chart of the newly created office was obtained by The Times.
The strategic communications office, which began operations Sept. 15, is run
by Air Force Brig. Gen. Erv Lessel, who answers directly to Gen. George W.
Casey, the top U.S. commander in Iraq.

Partly out of concern about this new office, Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, distributed a letter Sept. 27 to the Joint
Chiefs and U.S. combat commanders in the field warning of the dangers of
having military public affairs (PA) too closely aligned with information
operations (IO).

"Although both PA and IO conduct planning, message development and media
analysis, the efforts differ with respect to audience, scope and intent, and
must remain separate," Myers wrote, according to a copy of the letter
obtained by The Times.

Pentagon officials say Myers is worried that U.S. efforts in Iraq and in the
broader campaign against terrorism could suffer if world audiences begin to
question the honesty of statements from U.S. commanders and spokespeople.

"While organizations may be inclined to create physically integrated PA/IO
offices, such organizational constructs have the potential to compromise the
commander's credibility with the media and the public," Myers wrote.

Myers' letter is not being heeded in Iraq, officials say, in part because
many top civilians at the Pentagon and National Security Council support an
effort that blends public affairs with psy-ops to win Iraqi support - and
Arab support in general - for the U.S. fight against the insurgency.

Advocates of these programs said that the advent of a 24-hour news cycle and
the powerful influence of Arabic satellite television made it essential that
U.S. military commanders and civilian officials made the control of
information a key part of their battle plans.

"Information is part of the battlefield in a way that it's never been
before," one senior Bush administration official said. "We'd be foolish not
to try to use it to our advantage."

And, supporters argue, it is necessary to fill a vacuum left when the
budgets for the State Department's public diplomacy programs were slashed
and the U.S. Information Agency - a bulwark of the nation's anticommunist
efforts during the Cold War - was gutted in the 1990s.

"The worst outcome would be to lose this war by default. If the smart folks
in the psy-op and civil affairs tents can cast a truthful, persuasive
message that resonates with the average Iraqi, why not use the public
affairs vehicles to transmit it?" asked Charles A. Krohn, a professor at the
University of Michigan and former deputy chief of public affairs for the
Army. "What harm is done, compared to what is gained? For the first year of
the war, we did virtually nothing to tell the Iraqis why we invaded their
country and ejected their government. It's about time we got our act
together."

Advocates also cite a September report by the Defense Science Board, a panel
of outside experts that advises Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, which
concluded that a "crisis" in U.S. "strategic communications" had undermined
American efforts to fight Islamic extremism worldwide.

The study cited polling in the Arab world that revealed widespread hatred of
the United States throughout the Middle East. A poll taken in June by Zogby
International revealed that 94% of Saudi Arabians had an "unfavorable" view
of the United States, compared with 87% in April 2002. In Egypt, the second
largest recipient of U.S. aid, 98% of respondents held an unfavorable view
of the United States.

The Defense Science Board recommended a presidential directive to
"coordinate all components of strategic communication including public
diplomacy, public affairs, international broadcasting and military
information operations."

Di Rita said there was general agreement inside the Bush administration that
the U.S. government was ill-equipped to communicate its policies and
messages abroad in the current media climate.

"As a government, we're not very well organized to do that," he said.

Yet some in the military argue that the efforts at better "strategic
communication" sometimes cross the line into propaganda, citing some recent
media briefings held in Iraq. During a Nov. 10 briefing by Marine Lt. Gen.
John F. Sattler, reporters were shown a video of Iraqi troops saluting their
flag and singing the Iraqi national anthem.

"Pretty soon, we're going to have the 5 o'clock follies all over again, and
it will take us another 30 years to restore our credibility," said a second
senior Defense official, referring to the much-ridiculed daily media
briefings in Saigon during the Vietnam War.

According to several Pentagon officials, the strategic communications
programs at the Defense Department are being coordinated by the office of
the undersecretary of Defense for policy, Douglas J. Feith.