The Counter-deception Blog

Saddam's deception was particularly risky--he depended on a bluff for his principle defenses. In that respect, by refusing to consider that he was bluffing, the US and its allies made Saddam's deterrence even greater--we reinforced his bluff. Even more remarkable, when the US called his bluff and invaded, and found no WMD, we continued to reinforce his bluff! Somehow we simply could not accept that, in the face of some very powerful potential opponents (Iran, Turkey, the US) Saddam would bet it all on a 3 and a 5 as his hole cards.

October 7, 2004 NYTimes.com
UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS: Saddam Hussein Sowed Confusion About Iraq's Arsenal as a Tactic of War
By DAVID JOHNSTON
WASHINGTON, Oct. 6 - Saddam Hussein hid behind ambiguities and evasions about whether Iraq possessed unconventional weapons - when in fact it had none - partly as a deterrent to Iran, according to a report by the chief American arms inspector in Iraq.
The former Iraqi leader never discussed deception as a policy and did not adopt a formal written directive outlining his orders, the report said. But privately he told aides, like Ali Hasan al-Majid, a close adviser, that "the better part of war is deceiving,'' the report said. Mr. Majid said Mr. Hussein "wanted to avoid appearing weak and did not reveal he was deceiving the world about the presence of W.M.D.,'' or weapons of mass destruction.
The report by the chief arms inspector, Charles A. Duelfer, described Mr. Hussein's posture on prohibited weapons as "a difficult balancing act between the need to disarm to achieve sanctions relief while at the same time retaining a strategic deterrent.''
Mr. Hussein never reconciled the two competing aims, the report found.
"The regime never resolved the contradiction inherent in this approach,'' it said. "Ultimately, foreign perceptions of these tensions contributed to the destruction of the regime.''
The report provided the first detailed examination of Mr. Hussein's thinking about unconventional weapons and offered an answer to one of the most enduring mysteries of the war in Iraq: why did Mr. Hussein risk so much to hide the truth that Iraq did not possess such weapons?
Overall, Mr. Hussein's strategic actions were aimed at one overriding objective, "the survival of himself, his regime and his legacy,'' the report concluded.
The report found that Mr. Hussein purposely communicated an ambiguous impression about whether Iraq possessed these weapons mainly as a deterrent to Iran, Baghdad's longstanding adversary, which fought a brutal war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988.
The report, based on interrogations of Mr. Hussein, who was captured late last year, and his subordinates, said the confusion also helped Mr. Hussein disguise his underlying desire to maintain the intellectual and industrial foundation needed to quickly rebuild a weapons program in the event Iraq succeeded in lifting international economic sanctions, another top priority for the former Iraqi leader.
Beyond that, Mr. Hussein maintained an almost mystical faith in the power of unconventional weapons, whose stocks, the inspector said, were largely destroyed by Iraq after the 1991 Persian Gulf war under pressure from the United Nations. The report found that Mr. Hussein believed that these weapons, particularly chemical arms, had preserved his rule through repeated military crises.
Earlier this year, the report said, Mr. Hussein was asked by an American interrogator why he had not used such weapons during the 1991 gulf war. Mr. Hussein replied, according to the report: "Do you think we are mad? What would the world have thought of us? We would have completely discredited those who had supported us.''
The report's conclusions are based in part on interrogations of Mr. Hussein conducted primarily by a senior F.B.I. interrogator who spent months questioning the former Iraqi leader in Arabic, attempting to extract information from Mr. Hussein about his weapons programs and other issues. It is not clear from the report whether the former Iraqi leader accepted the motives attributed to him.
Some American intelligence officials have said that Mr. Hussein was vague in responses to questions about his arsenal, and the report does not state explicitly whether Mr. Hussein himself has acknowledged that he engaged in a deception operation about these weapons before the war.
The report said Mr. Hussein's belief in unconventional weapons stemmed from their use in the Iran-Iraq war when the former Iraqi leader concluded that Iraq was "saved'' by employing chemical weapons against Iran. The report concluded that Mr. Hussein believed such weapons had helped him "multiple times,'' helping to stop Iranian ground offensives, and that ballistic missile attacks on Tehran had "broken its political will.''
In 1991, Mr. Hussein believed the threat that Iraq might use these weapons had helped deter the United States-led coalition from advancing as far as Baghdad. After that war, American authorities found unused chemical munitions that had been distributed to battlefield commanders.
The report said Mr. Hussein refused to dispel the impression that he still had such weapons even though the report concluded that his specialized weapons programs were nonexistent or mothballed in the early development stage because of international sanctions.
In Mr. Hussein's mind, the possibility that Iraq possessed these weapons helped keep Iraq's neighbors off balance. The report said the former Iraqi leader had compared the United Nations inspection process to an analogy of a warrior striking an enemy's wrist. "Despite the strength of the arm, striking the wrist or elbow can be a more decisive blow to incapacitate the entire arm; knowledge of your opponent's weakness is a weapon in itself."
But Mr. Hussein, the report said, was concerned that the inspections would "expose Iraq's vulnerability in comparison with Iran. He apparently realized that his adversaries were not the only ones who were confused by what the report referred to as Mr. Hussein's "mixed messages.''
According to the report, Mr. Hussein confused his own generals because he tried to foster the impression among them that Iraq could resist a ground attack using unconventional weapons.
"Then in a series of meetings in 2002, Saddam appears to have reversed course and advised various groups of senior officers and officials that Iraq did not in fact have W.M.D.,'' the report said.
Mr. Hussein's words had an immediate impact. Military morale plummeted when top commanders realized after the meetings in December 2002 that they would have to face the United States military with only conventional arms. Mr. Hussein created more confusion in March 2003 - the month American-led forces invaded - when he implied to his ministers and senior officers "that he had some kind of secret weapon.''